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Abstract—Information (biometric) security is concerned with the
assurance of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information in all forms, biometric information is very
sophisticated in terms of all, in this work we are focusing on data
pattern along with all security assurance, so that we can improve
the matching performance with good security assurance, here one
of the most effective RSA algorithm use with biometric
(fingerprint) data. Our work includes the determination of
appropriate key sizes with security issues and determines the
matching performance using
MATLAB and JDK1.6,
performance of this system is more than 86.7% and when
combines this with blind authentication techniques then we get all
security assurance with high performance biometric cryptosystem.

2.

3.

4.

Keywords—blind authentication, biometric cryptosystem, RSA,
fingerprint, MATLAB.

5.
6.

I. INTRODUCTION

7.

A Biometric is defined as a unique, measurable,
biological characteristic or trait for automatically
recognizing or verifying the identity of a human being
[1]. Statistically analyzing these biological
characteristics has become known as the science of
biometrics. These days, biometric technologies are
typically used to analyze human characteristics for
security purposes. Five of the most common physical
biometric patterns analyzed for security purposes are
the fingerprint, hand, eye, face, and voice. The
advantage claimed by biometric systems is that they
can
establish
an
unbreakable
one-on-one
correspondence between an individual and a piece of
data. The drawback of biometric systems is their
superficial invasiveness and the general risks that can
emerge when biometric data is not properly handled.
There are good practices that, when followed, can
provide the excellent match between data and identity
that biometrics promise; if not followed; it can lead to
enormous risks to privacy for an individual. Biometric
system is vulnerable to a variety of attacks aimed at
undermining the integrity of the authentication
process. These threats are [02][3]
1. Fake biometric (e.g., finger made from silicon face
mask, lens including fake iris texture) to the sensor.

8.

Replay attack, because an intercepted biometric (with
or without the cooperation of the genuine user) data is
submitted to the feature extractor.
Bypassing the sensor: the feature extractor module is
replaced with a Trojan horse program that functions
according to its designer's specifications (henceforth,
these users that try to break into systems protected by
biometric authentication will be collectively called
“Trudy").
Genuine feature values are replaced with values
(synthetic or real) selected by the attacker.
The matcher is replaced with a Trojan horse program.
The attacks on the template database (e.g., addition,
modification, or removal of templates) constitute.
The templates are tampered with (stolen, replaced, or
altered) in the transmission medium between the
template database and matcher.
The matcher result (accepts or reject) can be
overridden by the attacker.

Fig.1: possible attacks in biometric system

To protect the information from these attacks an
efficient method of authentication called Blind
Authentication Protocol [4] came which addressed
the concerns of user privacy, template protection and
trust issue. Enrollment and authentication are the two
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primary processes involved in a biometric security
system. During enrollment, biometric measurements
are captured from a subject and related information
from the raw measurements is gleaned by the feature
extractor, and this information is stored on the
database.
During
authentication,
biometric
information is detected and compared against the
database through pattern recognition techniques that
involve a feature extractor and a biometric matcher
working in cascade a typical automated
biometrics-based identification.

spatial frequency, orientation, or phase; and hence, by
decomposing the image in several spatial frequency
and orientation channels fingerprints can be
discriminated or matched. In this work we are using
minutiae based matching with the ROI area concept,
one of the main difficulties in the minutiae-based
approach is that it is very difficult to reliably extract
minutiae in a poor quality fingerprint image. So image
enhancement is also done by FFT based techniques .as
show in fig.3

2. BIOMETRIC INFORMATION
CRYPTOSYSTEM
Biometrics provides security benefits across the
spectrum, from IT vendors to end users, and from
security system developers to security system users
[6][7]. Motivation of using biometric information is
that biometric system provides automatic recognition
of an individual based on some unique features or
characteristics possessed by the individual. Sensor
technology is also improved, this is another motivation
factor. Biometric systems have been developed based
on common biometric traits such as fingerprint, facial
features, iris, hand geometry, voice, handwriting, etc.
A good biometric is characterized by use of a feature
that is; highly unique - so that the chance of any two
people having the same characteristic will be minimal,
stable - so that the feature does not change over time,
and be easily acquired - in order to provide
convenience to the user, and prevent misrepresentation
of the feature. Fingerprint recognition is the oldest
method of biometric identification. In those time the
fingerprint identification technique was used, with the
name as actyloscopy[8]. The fingerprint is composed
of ridges (lines across fingerprints) and valleys (spaces
between ridges).The pattern of fingerprint is unique
for each individual and it is immutable there are six
stages involved in fingerprint cryptosystem as show in
fig: 2.
A sensor takes a mathematical snapshot of the user's
unique pattern, which is then saved in a fingerprint
database. A fingerprint enhancement algorithm (that
uses Gabor filters as band-pass filters to remove the
noise and preserve true ridge/valley structures) is
included in the minutiae extraction module to ensure
that the performance of the system is not affected by
variations in quality of fingerprint images. The
continuously changing directions of the ridges
constitute an oriented texture, possessing different

Fig: 2 Biometric Cryptosystem
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by mathematicians and security professionals for more
than a quarter of a century. While a number of attacks
have been devised during this period, exploiting
special properties of the RSA function as well as
details in particular implementations, it has stood up
well over the years and its security has never been put
into doubt. No devastating attack has ever been found
and most problems appear to be the result of misuse of
the system, bad choice of parameters or flaws in
implementations. In fact, years of research have
probably increased the trust the security community
has on RSA, and we have every reason to believe that
it will remain the most used public-key algorithm for
years to come. [10][11][12].
For a survey of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem [10]
of course, there are also attacks that aim not at the
cryptosystem itself but at a given unsecure
implementation of the system. These do not count as
‘‘breaking’’ the RSA system, because it is not any
weakness in the RSA algorithm that is exploited, but
rather a weakness in a specific implementation. RSA
encryption and digital signature algorithm is
considered secure if keys are 1024 - 4096 bits long
[12].
The public key in this cryptosystem consists of the
value n, which is called the modulus, and the value e,
which is called the public exponent. The private key
consists of the modulus n and the value d, which is
called the private exponent. An RSA public-key /
private-key pair can be generated by the following
steps:
1. Generate a pair of large, random prime’s p and q
2. Compute the modulus n as n = p×q.
3. Select an odd public exponent e between 3 and n-1
that is relatively prime to p-1 and q-1.
4. Compute the private exponent d from e, p and q.
5. Output (n, e) as the public key and (n, d) as the
private key.
The encryption operation in the RSA cryptosystem is
exponentiation to the eth power modulo n:
c = ENCRYPT (m) = m×e mod n.
The input m is the message; the output c is the
resulting cipher text. In practice, the message m is
typically some kind of appropriately formatted key to
be shared. The actual message is encrypted with the
shared key using a traditional encryption algorithm.
This construction makes it possible to encrypt a
message of any length with only one exponentiation.
The decryption operation is exponentiation to the dth
power modulo n:
m = DECRYPT (c) = c×d mod n.
The relationship between the exponent’s e and d
ensures that encryption and decryption are inverses, so

Fig.3 different processing steps for an fingerprint
3.RSA

The RSA cryptosystem is one of the well known
public-key cryptosystem that offers both encryption
and digital signatures (authentication). The RSA
cryptosystem is the de facto standard for public-key
encryption and signature worldwide. It is implemented
in the most popular security products and protocols in
use today, and can be seen as one of the basis for
secure communication in the Internet. Its underlying
function and properties have been extensively studied
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that the decryption operation recovers the original
Sensor Type
Optical sensor
“TouchViewII”
by Identix

Image
Size
388x34
(142 k
pixels)

Size of Set
10 users x 8
fingerprints per
user

that it can classify any feature vector, making it
applicable to multiple biometrics.

Resoluti
on
500 dpi

5. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
We have performed several experiments to evaluate the
performance of RSA on biometric data template
(fingerprint) using, MATLAB 7.5 and Java jdk1.6.
Hardware configuration of system on which all the
experiments were conducted is: - Intel Core 2 Duo
processor and 100 Mbps Intranet. For the fingerprint
data we have used the FVC2002 fingerprint image
database.. Experimentally combined fingerprint
matching and verification method was done by building
a minutia extractor and a minutia matcher.

message m. Without the private key (n, d) (or
equivalently the prime factors p and q), it’s difficult to
recover m from c. Consequently, n and e can be made
public without compromising security, which is the
basic requirement for a public-key cryptosystem.

4. BLIND AUTHENTICATION
In the field of Information Technology the Blind
Authentication is the basis for a new class of
authentication schemes. The main reasons for
attractiveness of blind authentication are the fact that
the authentication protocol can run over public networks
and provide Non-repudiable identity verification. The
encryption also provides template protection, the ability
to revoke enrolled templates, and alleviates the concerns
on privacy in widespread use of biometrics. The
proposed approach makes no restrictive assumptions on
the biometric data and is hence applicable to multiple
biometrics. Such a protocol has significant advantages
over existing biometric cryptosystems, which use a
biometric to secure a secret key, which in turn is used for
authentication [4].

TABLE 1
Details of Biometric data base (FVC2002)

Performance evaluations:
The performance of a biometric authentication system
can be measured [16] as the False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) or the False Rejection Rate (FRR)) which are
defined as:
FRR=Number of false rejection/Number client accesses
(1)
FAR= Number of false
acceptance/ Number client accesses (2)

We define Blind Authentication as [04, 05] a Biometric
Authentication Protocol that does not reveal any
information about the biometric samples to the
authenticating server. It also does not reveal any
information regarding the classifier, employed by the
server, to the user or client Blind Authentication
addresses all the concerns mentioned below.

A perfect biometric authentication system would have a
FRR =0 and a FAR =0 which is a little bit not achievable
in reality. It is also interesting that any of the two values
FRR and FAR can be reduced to an arbitrary small
number, with the drawback of increasing the other value
another interesting value is the Total Error Rate TER
Equation (3) which is defined as:

1) The ability to use strong encryption addresses
template protection issues as well as privacy concerns.
2) Non-repudiable authentication can be carried out
even between non trusting client and server using a
trusted third party solution.
3) It provides provable protection against replay and
client side attacks even if the keys of the user are
compromised.
4) As the enrolled templates are encrypted using a key,
one can replace any compromised template, providing
revocability, while allaying concerns of being tracked.
In addition, the framework is generic in the sense that

TER = (No. of FA + No. of FR)/ total number of access
(3)
The overall performance of a biometric authentication
system should not be measured by the TER but rather by
the Receiver Operation Characteristic ROC, which
represents the FAR as a function of the FRR. So
wherever there is a tradeoff of error types, a single
performance number is inadequate to represent the
capabilities of a system. Such a system has many
operating points and is best represented by a
performance curve. The ROC curve has been used for
plotted on the vertical axis A DET curve is a modified
ROC curve which is sometimes preferred for its ease of

this purpose. Generally false alarm is plotted on the
horizontal axis whereas the correct detection rate is
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interpretation To the using of RSA for encryption and
decryption of 30 pair of fingerprint we found that the
FAR and FRR the results were as follows:
No. of False Accepts = 2 (6.6%)
No. of False Rejects = 1 (3.33 %)
The total error rate = (3+1)/30=13.3%

Hence the result shows that the accuracy in this work is
86.7%.

Fig5: Graph between encrypted file size and key size

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The result of this experiments shows that when we
increase the key size then it is good for security. When
the key size is increased from 2048 to 4096 bits, the data
size (after encryption) will reduce. But time taken for
cryptographic operations will increase. Conclusively it
can be said that for secure transmission of biometric data
template over an unsecured network we should increase
key size, it will only affect the time to encrypt and
decrypt the data without destroying the pattern of
biometric data, the matching efficiency after
cryptographic operation is more than 86% as show in
result .When it combine the blind authentication then we
will get all security assurance with good matching
efficiency. The future extension to this work will be to
reduce the time complexity for cryptographic purposes.
To achieve this another highly secured public key
encryption technique called as ECC [13][14] can be
used. If we decrease the key size then we can improve
the cryptographic performance of the biometric
information but again we should check data pattern to
improve the matching performance for any biometric
authentication system.

Fig.4 Graph between encrypt time and key size
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